Can-Kicking and Conflict

Within a few days, two attacks have brought the war in Ukraine back into the news. Russian missiles targeted the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital and a maternity hospital in Kyiv, killing 31 people, five of them children. On Saturday, Donald Trump literally dodged a bullet by a few millimetres.

With the echoes of the Stars and Stripes being raised by US Marines in Iwo Jima in 1945, the images of Trump Invictus almost guarantees that the former President is the future President. In the governments of NATO member states across Europe, hearts surely sank: their defence budgets must rise.

Long before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the bombastic Trump berated NATO members over their persistent refusal to honour their defence commitments. At the 2018 NATO summit, he singled out Germany for spending just over 1 per cent GDP, adding that it was “totally controlled” by Russia because of its energy dependency on Moscow. In February, he branded NATO’s European defence misers as “delinquent”.

Congratulating themselves on a continent at peace since 1945 – overlooking a brutal civil war in the former Yugoslavia – for three decades, successive leaders in Western Europe have been eager to take the post-Cold War peace dividend, cutting defence spending to the minimum. Like sulky teenagers who protest that they hate their parents only to demand that their pocket money be raised, too many NATO members today order the United States to do more to help Ukraine, without considering that their refusal to take security seriously over the past 30 years has created a climate for Russian expansionism.

Although Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the 1982 Conservative Party Conference was given in the wake of the successful Falklands campaign, the overarching theme was the threat from the Soviet Union and the consequent need for the nuclear deterrent. She accused the Labour Opposition of seeking to “dismantle Britain’s defence wholesale” while they continued sheltering behind US protection. “To expect an insurance policy but to refuse to pay the premium.” NATO heads of government take note.

Washington officials have been long been trying to persuade their greedy allies to stop free-riding and start paying their way. In 2006 NATO defence ministers agreed to a defence spending guideline of 2 per cent of GDP, described by the alliance as “an important indicator of the political resolve of individual Allies to contribute to NATO’s common defence efforts.”

Clearly, resolve was weak: only the UK, the US and Greece hit the target. In 2014, in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Defence Investment Pledge re-committed NATO members to it. But today, even with state-on-state war in Europe, only 23 of the 35 allies are expected to meet or exceed the target this year. Amid the gladhanding and Presidential gaffes at last week’s NATO summit in Washington, Secretary-General Stoltenberg was however keen to stress progress is being made: “European allies and Canada are really stepping up.”

Ukraine has forced most allies finally to face up to their defence responsibilities. Compared to 2021, almost four times as many are hitting 2 per cent, including for the first time, Germany. But the less said about Spain (1.28 per cent), wealthy Luxembourg (1.29 per cent) and Italy (1.49 per cent), truly a Coalition of the Unwilling, the better. And let’s not forget, 2 per cent should be a minimum.

Whether some NATO members’ newly found zeal in taking responsibility for themselves will impress Donald Trump, and as importantly his Vice-Presidential running mate, is moot. The choice of Hillbilly Elegy author, Senator J.D. Vance, sends a message that the sneered-at deplorables of America’s rustbelt are on the political radar. Vance has expressed reservations about sending limitless largesse to Ukraine courtesy of American taxpayer. Trump himself might be seeking a Kyiv-Moscow peace deal, says Hungary’s PM Orban.

Last week in Washington, Prime Minister Starmer told NATO allies to increase defence spending, which was a bit rich. Britain’s 2.33 per cent of GDP is paltry compared to Poland (4.12 per cent) and the United States (3.38 per cent).

This week, the new Government confirmed it was embarking upon a Strategic Defence Review. Why? It will come in the wake of last year’s Integrated Review Refresh, which in turn followed the Johnson government’s 2021 Integrated Review of security, defence, development and foreign policy. This included a command paper, Defence in a Competitive Age.

Even with the involvement of the august Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, who oversaw the Blair government’s stellar Strategic Defence Review of 1998, there must be a question about the necessity of yet another audit, especially as it is not expected to report until well into next year. While committed to the “nuclear triple-lock”, the government seems less keen to hit an unambitious 2.5 per cent GDP target, a paradox in the light of its warnings about a “deadly quartet” of Russia, Iran, China and North Korea.

The SDR is surely a can-kicking exercise, enabling some time to be bought before some unpalatable choices are made. Helpfully, should it go ahead, a Trump administration peace deal will enable Europe to return to business as usual: welfare not warfare. Feckless European nations can sit back and enjoy a level of social insurance that many American taxpayers can only dream about.

Last year, US military spending stood at $916 billion. Despite President Trump’s bluster about America First, the commitment to NATO was upheld during his first term, which could be the guide to his second.

It is unlikely that PM Starmer would favour guns over butter, i.e., military spending over social programmes. But unless Britain’s Armed Forces are unequivocally a Tier One military, there seems little point in the UK continuing to be a permanent member of the United Nations’ Security Council. Perhaps we should give up our seat to Poland.